๐ŸšงMathematical Proof

Comparison Between QV and PQV

Voting Method
Ballots
Ballots in Sybil Attack
Max Ballots
Sybil Resistancy

QV

x\sqrt{x}

kx\sqrt{kx}

xx

โŒ

PQV

โ€‹โ€‹โ€‹โ€‹x\sqrt{x} or 0, ELE_L

ERE_R

xNxโ‰คx\frac{x}{N}\sqrt{x}\leq \sqrt{x}

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Sybil Resistancy

PQV can prove its quality as a new voting system by mathematically proving its Sybil resistancy without (less) harming the result of existing QV.

Equation 1

EL=xNxE_{L}= \frac{x}{N}\sqrt{x}

Assume that total number of votes is NN and the number of votes a user has is xx. The expected value of votes when xx votes are honestly voted at once from one account can be expressed as [Equation 1].

Equation 2

ER=โˆ‘p=0k(kp)(x/kN)p(1โˆ’x/kN)kโˆ’ppxkE_{R}= \sum_{p=0}^{k}\binom{k}{p}\left( \frac{x/k}{N} \right)^p\left(1- \frac{x/k}{N}\right)^{k-p}p\sqrt{\frac{x}{k}}

[Equation 2] is expected value of votes in a situation when xx votes are divided into kk to do Sybil attack. pp is the number of groups reflected in the vote out of kk.

Equation 3

EL>ERE_{L} \gt E_{R}

when kNXโ‰ 0โˆจk>1\frac{kN}{X}\neq 0 \vee k\gt 1

In order for a Sybil attack to always less beneficial than an honest vote, the condition of [Equation 3] needs to be satisfied. This condition is always satisfied because xx, NN are not 00 and kk is always bigger than 22 to do Sybil attack.

PQV makes it always a loss to do sybil attack by applying probabilistic element on quadratic voting. Splitting voting power makes the expected value of voting power lower that executing 1 voting power. Therefore, rational users who want to maximize their voting influence will honestly exercise their votes at once by using one account. This means PQV can prevent Sybil attacks.

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