PQV
  • ๐Ÿ–๏ธIntroduction
    • Problem and Solution
  • Problem: Background
    • โ˜‘๏ธEvolution of Voting System
    • ๐ŸงจSybil Attack
  • Solution: PQV
    • ๐Ÿ’กProbabilistic QV
    • ๐ŸšงMathematical Proof
    • ๐Ÿค–Simulation
      • Environment
      • Results
    • ๐Ÿ”ขPQV Calculator
  • Use Cases
    • ๐Ÿ’ตQuadratic Funding
    • ๐Ÿ”‘PoS/DPoS
    • ๐ŸงฑApplications
      • LeGovernor
  • Governor C
    • ๐Ÿ›๏ธGovernor C
    • ๐Ÿ‘ฉโ€๐Ÿ’ปDeveloper Guides
  • Discussions
    • โ›“๏ธMulti-Chain PQV
  • References
    • Papers
  • D3LAB Media
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On this page
  • Comparison Between QV and PQV
  • Sybil Resistancy
  • Equation 1
  • Equation 2
  • Equation 3
  1. Solution: PQV

Mathematical Proof

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Last updated 3 years ago

Comparison Between QV and PQV

Voting Method
Ballots
Ballots in Sybil Attack
Max Ballots
Sybil Resistancy

QV

PQV

  • Ballots means Reflected votes

  • ELE_LELโ€‹: Refer to

  • ERE_RERโ€‹: Refer to

Sybil Resistancy

PQV can prove its quality as a new voting system by mathematically proving its Sybil resistancy without (less) harming the result of existing QV.

Equation 1

EL=xNxE_{L}= \frac{x}{N}\sqrt{x}ELโ€‹=Nxโ€‹xโ€‹

Assume that total number of votes is NNN and the number of votes a user has is xxx. The expected value of votes when xxx votes are honestly voted at once from one account can be expressed as [Equation 1].

Equation 2

ER=โˆ‘p=0k(kp)(x/kN)p(1โˆ’x/kN)kโˆ’ppxkE_{R}= \sum_{p=0}^{k}\binom{k}{p}\left( \frac{x/k}{N} \right)^p\left(1- \frac{x/k}{N}\right)^{k-p}p\sqrt{\frac{x}{k}}ERโ€‹=p=0โˆ‘kโ€‹(pkโ€‹)(Nx/kโ€‹)p(1โˆ’Nx/kโ€‹)kโˆ’ppkxโ€‹โ€‹

[Equation 2] is expected value of votes in a situation when xxx votes are divided into kkk to do Sybil attack. ppp is the number of groups reflected in the vote out of kkk.

Equation 3

EL>ERE_{L} \gt E_{R}ELโ€‹>ERโ€‹

when kNXโ‰ 0โˆจk>1\frac{kN}{X}\neq 0 \vee k\gt 1XkNโ€‹๎€ =0โˆจk>1

In order for a Sybil attack to always less beneficial than an honest vote, the condition of [Equation 3] needs to be satisfied. This condition is always satisfied because xxx, NNN are not 000 and kkk is always bigger than 222 to do Sybil attack.

PQV makes it always a loss to do sybil attack by applying probabilistic element on quadratic voting. Splitting voting power makes the expected value of voting power lower that executing 1 voting power. Therefore, rational users who want to maximize their voting influence will honestly exercise their votes at once by using one account. This means PQV can prevent Sybil attacks.

โ€‹โ€‹โ€‹โ€‹ or 0,

๐Ÿšง
x\sqrt{x}xโ€‹
kx\sqrt{kx}kxโ€‹
xx x
x\sqrt{x} xโ€‹
ELE_LELโ€‹
ERE_RERโ€‹
xNxโ‰คx\frac{x}{N}\sqrt{x}\leq \sqrt{x}Nxโ€‹xโ€‹โ‰คxโ€‹
Equation 1
Equation 2
โŒ
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